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Arrow cues and other overlearned spatial symbols automatically orient attention according to 
their spatial meaning. this renders them similar to exogenous cues that occur at stimulus location. 
exogenous cues trigger shifts of attention even when they are presented subliminally. here, we 
investigate to what extent the mechanisms underlying the orienting of attention by exogenous 
cues and by arrow cues are comparable by analyzing the effects of visible and masked arrow cues 
on attention. in experiment 1, we presented arrow cues with overall 50% validity. visible cues, but 
not masked cues, lead to shifts of attention. in experiment 2, the arrow cues had an overall validity 
of 80%. now both visible and masked arrows lead to shifts of attention. this is in line with findings 
that subliminal exogenous cues capture attention only in a top-down contingent manner, that is, 
when the cues fit the observer’s intentions.
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IntroductIon
Our ability to focus cognitive resources on behaviorally relevant stimuli 
enables us to efficiently act and interact with our environment. This 
selection process is, amongst other things, achieved through spatial 
shifts of attention. These shifts of attention can happen in two ways, 
which both have been investigated extensively (e.g., Folk, Remington, 
& Johnston, 1992; Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980; 
Posner & Cohen, 1984; Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Johnson, 1990). On 
the one hand, shifts of attention can be initiated intentionally by the 
observer, for example, because a task like a visual search task demands 
shifting attention to several locations in the visual field to find a target 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman, Sykes, & Gelade, 1977; Wolfe, 
1994), or because we follow a sign or a cue stimulus that informs us about 
the likely location of a target stimulus (Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & 
Davidson, 1980). This kind of shift of attention is often referred to as 
being endogenous, and is thus thought to reflect an intentional orienting 
of attention under internal cognitive control. On the other hand, sud-
den stimulus onsets, like a loud bang, or a flash of light, automatically 
draw our attention to them, without our intention to do so (e.g., Jonides 
& Yantis, 1988). This automatic capture of attention is called exogenous, 
which refers to the external aspect of this kind of orienting of attention. 
Endogenous  and  exogenous  shifts  of  attention  have  distinctive 
confining features. These features were investigated, for example, with 
the spatial cuing paradigm (Posner, 1980; Posner et al., 1980) in which 
a cue informs a participant about the location of the following target. 
Thereby, cues are either valid (i.e., the cue correctly informs a partici-
pant about the actual location of the target) or invalid (the cue signals a 
location where the target does not appear). The difference in response 
time (RT) between trials with invalid cues and trials with valid cues 
(the validity effect) is an indicator for shifts of attention, as this differ-
ence results from facilitated processing of the target stimulus (because 
its location is already attended to) after valid cues as compared to the 
necessity to first reorient attention to the target location after invalid 
cues (Posner, 1980). 
Validity effects occur even if the cue is not related to a certain 
response (because a participant has to respond to the identity of the 
target, not to its location, which is cued). Thus, the validity effect can-
not be attributed to response priming. Instead it is assumed that par-
ticipants orient their attention to the cued location. This assumption is AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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further supported by electrophysiological measurements that provide 
evidence for the link between validity effects and orienting of attention 
(e.g., Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; Vossel, Thiel, & Fink, 2006). 
In the spatial cuing paradigm, the nature of the cue, as well as the 
nature of its influence on our attentional system, can be varied. First, 
there are exogenous cues, which are sudden stimulus onsets, typically a 
change in luminance, that occur directly at the possible target location. 
Exogenous cues lead to shifts of attention even when the cues indicate 
the actual location of the target only at chance level so that there is no 
overall benefit for a participant to attend to the cued location (e.g., Folk 
& Remington, 1998, 1999; Posner, 1980; Remington, Folk, & McLean, 
2001). Even when participants are instructed to ignore the cues, the 
cues capture attention (Jonides, 1981). This reflects the automatic and 
externally driven nature of exogenous orienting of attention. 
Second, there are endogenous cues that are presented centrally, for 
example, letters or signs that indicate one of the possible target loca-
tions. For these cues, the mapping of cue to location is arbitrary. Thus, 
the cues have to be interpreted first, before the participant can then 
shift attention according to the cues’ meaning. This shift of attention is 
endogenously initiated by a participant and there usually needs to be a 
benefit for the participants to shift attention according to the instruc-
tion. In contrast to exogenous cues, endogenous cues have to predict 
the target location above chance level (e.g., valid cues in 80% of trials) 
in order to lead to shifts of attention.
There are cases, however, in which centrally presented cues lead to 
shifts of attention even if they do not predict the target location above 
chance level. Some symbolic cues seem to have an automatic effect 
akin to that of exogenous cues. First, it was found that social cues like 
pointing gestures (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000) or eye gaze (Driver 
et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Kunde, Skirde, & Weigelt, 2011; 
Langton & Bruce, 1999) automatically trigger orienting of attention. If, 
for example, eyes that gaze either to the left or to the right (two possible 
target locations) are centrally presented as cues, attention is oriented to 
the cued location even if the eye gaze cues correctly predict the target 
location only in 50% of the trials. Second, the same was found for sym-
bolic cues that have a very strong spatial meaning, like the words right 
or left, or arrows pointing in one direction (Eimer, 1997; Friesen, Ristic, 
& Kingstone, 2004; Gibson & Bryant, 2005; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & 
Godijn, 2001; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Hommel, 2010; Tipples, 2002). 
For example, Eimer (1997) showed both with behavioral and with 
electrophysiological data that centrally presented arrow cues impact 
on attention even when they are not informative. It seems that seeing 
a conventional, overlearned symbol with a spatial meaning automati-
cally directs one’s visual attention to the location this symbol designates 
(Hommel et al., 2001). Consequently, it was argued that eye gaze and 
arrow cues trigger shifts of attention that are truly reflexive, and not 
under volitional control (Stevens, West, Al-Aidroos, Weger, & Pratt, 
2008). In a way, these symbolic cues automatically influence attention 
similarly to exogenous cues.
Exogenous cues that are masked still have the power to capture at- the power to capture at-
tention (e.g., Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; 
Ivanoff & Klein, 2003; Lambert, Naikar, McLachlan, & Aitken, 1999; 
McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse, Talsma, & Theeuwes, 2007; Scharlau, 
2002; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003; for a 
review,  see  Mulckhuyse  &  Theeuwes,  2010).  During  masking,  the 
visibility of a brief visual stimulus is reduced, sometimes down to a 
level of invisibility so that a participant is not aware of the stimulus, 
by subsequent or preceding visual masking stimuli near or at the loca-
tion of the masked stimuli (in this case, the cue). In one of the first 
studies on this subject, which also illustrates the difference between 
endogenous and exogenous orienting of attention, McCormick (1997) 
used peripheral bars as cues that participants were either aware or 
unaware of. Participants were instructed not to attend to the location 
where the cue appeared, but to the opposite location, where the target 
would appear in 85% of the trials. McCormick reasoned that the cue 
would first capture attention exogenously, but when participants were 
aware of the cue, they would reorient their attention endogenously 
away from the cue as instructed. This should result in faster RTs when 
the target appears at the opposite location than when the target ap-
pears at the same location as the cue. When participants were unaware 
of the cue, however, no endogenous reorienting should occur, and 
enhanced performance when the target appears at the location of the 
cue would demonstrate that the cues captured attention exogenously. 
The results indeed indicated that subliminal cues captured attention, 
as RTs were shorter when the target appeared at the location of the cue 
than when it appeared at the other location (one should note, however, 
that an alternative account based on inhibition of return [Klein, 2000] 
is also viable to explain this pattern of results). This also shows that 
participants were not able to reorient their attention endogenously ac-
cording to the instruction when they were unaware of the cue, which 
underlines the strong connection between awareness and endogenous 
control (Posner & Snyder, 1975). When participants were aware of the 
cue, they reoriented their attention and, thus, RTs were shorter when 
the target appeared at the likely location opposite of the cue than at the 
unlikely location.
In  elaborating  determinants  of  subliminal  exogenous  cuing, 
Ansorge and Neumann (2005) investigated if masked singleton-cues 
are able to draw attention to them, and further if this attentional cap-
ture is purely stimulus-driven or depends on top-down settings, that 
is, active intentions of the participant. First, their results showed that 
masked cues were able to trigger shifts of attention. Participants re-
sponded faster after valid than after invalid cues, even when the cues 
were masked. Second, they found that attentional capture only worked 
when the cues’ features were fitting those of the task settings. For ex-
ample, in Experiment 2, participants had to respond to red bars, but 
the cues were black, not red. The effect of the masked cues was virtually 
eliminated. The authors concluded that the effect of masked exogenous 
cues depends on the participant’s intention, as governed by the task 
instructions. If masked cues do not match control settings which are 
set up according to the instruction to search for a target with certain 
features, the cues have no or only a very minor effect. More recently, 
it has been shown that only task-relevant features of subliminally pre-
sented color singletons captured spatial attention, while cues that did 
not match top-down settings (i.e., with a task-irrelevant color) did not AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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(Ansorge, Horstmann, & Worschech, 2010; see also Held, Ansorge, & 
Müller, 2010). 
Thus, masked exogenous cuing effects seem to be restricted to 
top-down-contingent capture. This means that a cue captures atten-
tion only when it fits to current top-down settings of the participant 
(e.g., when it fits to current search templates). Folk et al. (1992) dem-
onstrated this phenomenon for unmasked cues. They showed that 
cues that appeared at possible target locations captured attention only 
when the cues shared the feature used to locate the target (e.g., abrupt 
onset or specific color). Folk and colleagues concluded that attentional 
control settings are a function of behavioral goals. Events or stimuli 
that exhibit goal-corresponding features are able to capture attention. 
Such attentional capture is thus dependent on top-down-settings, and 
not per se dependent on overall cue validity. As we will argue later, 
however, overall cue validity can influence top-down settings and thus 
modulate contingent capture. 
More evidence that masked singleton-cues are able to capture at-
tention, but that this effect is contingent on top-down control settings, 
comes from perceptual latency priming (Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau & 
Ansorge, 2003; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003). When a masked cue pre-
cedes a visible target, the target is perceived as temporally leading an-
other comparison stimulus. This is interpreted as facilitated processing 
of the target due to attentional capture of the cue. This effect, however, 
is absent or reduced when the cue does not have a target-like shape or 
color (Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003).
The rationale behind our study was that overlearned spatial cues 
(like arrows) are able to orient attention automatically in a way that 
seems similar to that of exogenous cues. Thus, masked arrow cues 
might be able to orient attention in the same way as masked exogenous 
cues do. Furthermore, we tested if such influences on attention depend 
on top-down settings. We assumed that when cues are informative 
regarding the target’s location, participants would more likely have 
the intention to use the cues to guide their attention than when cues 
are not informative with regard to the target’s location. To this end, 
we conducted two experiments that used the spatial cuing paradigm. 
In both experiments, participants were presented either a visible or 
a masked central arrow cue and then had to respond to a peripheral 
target. We varied the overall cue validity such that in Experiment 1 
cues were not predictive, that is, overall cue validity was 50% (with two 
target locations), and participants had no incentive to prepare to use 
the cues. In Experiment 2, the cues were predictive with an overall cue 
validity of 80%, so that participants were likely to intentionally use the 
arrow cues and to set up fitting top-down settings as this would benefit 
their performance.
Figure 1.
sequence of stimuli in trials in experiments 1 and 2. on the left, the sequence of stimuli in a trial with a non-masked arrow cue that is 
valid is illustrated. on the right, the sequence of stimuli in a trial with a masked arrow cue that is invalid is illustrated.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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ExpErImEnt 1
Method
ParticiPants
Twenty students (11 female, 9 male) of the University of Würzburg 
with an average age of 25 years participated in individual sessions of 
approximately 50 min either in fulfillment of course requirements or 
in return for payment (6 €). All participants reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision, and were naive with respect to the hypothesis 
of the experiment. 
aPParatus and stimuli
An IBM compatible computer with a 17 inch VGA-Display and the 
software package E-Prime™ (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) 
were used for stimulus presentation and response sampling. Stimulus 
presentation was synchronized with the vertical retraces of a 100-Hz 
monitor, resulting in a refresh rate of 10 ms. Viewing distance was ap-
proximately 60 cm. Responses were executed with the index fingers of 
both hands and collected with external response keys. All stimuli were 
presented in black on a white background. 
A central arrow extending 2.5 × 1.0 cm was used as cue, point-
ing either to the right or left side. The arrow was either metacontrast-
masked (see Breitmeyer, 1984) by a larger rectangle extending 3.9 × 2.3 
cm with an inner edge fitting exactly the contours of the arrow cues, or 
non-masked by just being underlined with a horizontal residual line 
of the mask extending 2.5 × 0.3 cm. The letters X or O, typed in bold 
Courier New font with a font size of 24 pixels, served as targets and 
were presented either on the right or on the left side, with a distance of 
11.3 cm to the center of the screen. 
Procedure and design
The sequence of events in a trial is depicted in Figure 1. Each trial 
started with a central fixation cross extending 0.7 x 0.7 cm that was 
presented for 400 ms. Following the fixation cross, a central arrow cue 
was presented for two refresh cycles of the display (20 ms). After cue 
presentation a blank white screen was displayed for 20 ms followed 
either by a metacontrast mask or an underline that was presented for 
120 ms, followed again by a blank white screen, displayed for 40 ms. 
At last, the target letter was presented for 250 ms. Participants had to 
respond within a time window of 5,000 ms after target onset. After 
response execution a fixed time interval of 1,000 ms elapsed before the 
next trial started. All eight different possible combinations of cue (left/
right-pointing arrow), masked/non-masked, target identity (X/O), and 
target side (left/right) were repeated 80 times each (for a total of 640 
trials altogether), and conditions varied randomly on a trial-by-trial-
basis. Thus, the arrow cue had an overall validity of 50%. After every 64 
trials, participants were allowed a short, self-paced break.
Participants were informed that an arrow was to appear before 
target onset in some of the trials, and that the arrow was pointing cor-
rectly to the side where the target letter was to appear in 50% of these 
trials. They were instructed to look first at the fixation cross and then 
to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to the identity of the 
laterally presented target letter. Half of the participants had to press a 
left key when the letter O was presented and a right key when the letter 
X was presented. For the other half of the participants, the mapping 
was reversed. Errors were indicated by the German word for wrong 
(“Falsch!”) presented in red in the lower part of the monitor. Response 
times were recorded from the onset of the target stimulus until a re-
sponse was given.
assessment of cue Visibility
A visibility test with 128 trials with non-masked and masked arrow 
cues was applied directly after the main experiment. Participants were 
fully informed about the structure of a trial and the presence of masked 
(and non-masked) cues. They had to perform a forced-choice discri-
mination task. For this task, the sequence of stimuli was exactly the 
same as in the main experiment. However, there was no time limit after 
target onset. Participants were asked to discriminate whether a right- or 
a left-pointing arrow was presented, and had to press either “1” (for a 
left-pointing arrow) or “0” (for a right-pointing arrow) on the number 
pad of the keyboard. Participants could freely choose which fingers to 
use for this task. Participants were instructed to take their time, and to 
try to be as accurate as possible. They were also encouraged to guess if 
they thought they had not seen anything, and were reminded to bear in 
mind that the probability for a left- or right-pointing arrow was equal. 
In order to avoid that unconscious priming effects influence the free 
response choice (Kiesel, Wagener, et al., 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 
2004), response keys in the cue visibility task differed as compared to 
the main experiment and, additionally, there was an interval of 750 
ms after target offset in which no response was possible (see Vorberg, 
Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003).
Results
Validity effects
Trials with RTs deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations  from 
the mean RT of each participant and each condition were excluded 
(2.1%). Mean RTs for correct responses were submitted to the analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subject factors Masking (masked 
and non-masked cue) and Validity (valid and invalid cue). The factor 
Validity was significant, F(1, 19) = 10.2, p < .01, η2 = .35, as well as the 
interaction of Masking × Validity, F(1, 19) = 7.0, p < .05, η2 = .27. The 
main effect of Masking was not significant, p = .16. Single compari-
sons revealed that only non-masked cues, t(19) = 3.4, p < .01, but not 
masked cues, t(19) = 0.8, p = .93, elicited a validity effect. Participants 
responded 11 ms faster to valid than to invalid non-masked arrow cues, 
while for masked cues there was no difference (0 ms) in RT between 
responses to invalid and to valid cues (see Figure 2). 
The overall mean error rate was 7.9%. The same ANOVA of error 
rates revealed no significant effects (ps ≥ .26). 
cue Visibility
Cue visibility was assessed by computing the signal detection mea-
sure d’, separately for non-masked and masked arrow cues, treating AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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the right-pointing arrow cue as signal and the left-pointing arrow cue 
as noise. Hits and false alarms proportions were corrected according 
to the log-linear rule if participants had 0% hits or 100% false alarms 
(Goodman, 1970, as cited in Hautus, 1995). 
Participants’ discrimination performance for the non-masked cues 
was d’ = 3.18, with a mean hit rate of 90.7 % and a mean false alarm rate 
of 9.6 %, and deviated from zero, t(19) = 12.09, p < .001. Participants’ 
discrimination performance for the masked cues was d’ = 0.64, with a 
mean hit rate of 70.0 % (i.e., when a right pointing arrow was present), 
and a mean false alarm rate of 49.2 %, and deviated from zero, t(19) = 
3.68, p < .01. Thus, there was a response bias to indicate a right-pointing 
cue in trials with masked cues, as this response was given in 59.6% of 
these trials. The d’ values for non-masked and masked arrow cues dif-
fered significantly from each other, t(38) = 8.58, p < .001.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we found that centrally presented arrow cues lead 
to shifts of attention although they are not predictive of the target 
location. With non-masked cues, participants responded 11 ms faster 
after valid cues than after invalid cues. This validity effect reflects shifts 
of attention following the arrow cue, which result in facilitated target 
processing after valid cues and hampered target processing after invalid 
cues because of the necessity to reorient attention to the target location. 
This result replicates the finding that endogenous cues with a strong 
spatial meaning, like arrows, impact on attention akin to exogenous 
cues (Hommel et al., 2001; Pratt et al., 2010; Tipples, 2002). 
With masked cues, however, no validity effect was found. In con-
trast to masked exogenous cues, masked arrow cues did not induce 
shifts of attention. Considering that an “overlearned symbol with a 
spatial meaning automatically directs one’s visual attention” (Hommel 
et al., 2001, p. 364), it seems rather counterintuitive that this automatic 
effect depends on the conscious experience of the arrow and cannot 
operate outside of awareness. However, it was repeatedly shown that 
the effects of masked exogenous cues are not purely bottom-up and 
stimulus-driven,  but  that  attentional  capture  strongly  depends  on 
top-down control settings (e.g., Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; Ansorge 
& Neumann, 2005; Ivanoff & Klein, 2003; Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau & 
Ansorge, 2003; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003). With the experimental 
design of Experiment 1, participants had no incentive to orient their 
attention according to the cue. The cues were not predictive regarding 
the actual location of the target, and participants were not explicitly 
instructed to orient their attention according to the cue. Therefore, we 
conjecture that participants did not form the top-down setting, or “ac-
tion plan”, to use the arrows by shifting attention to the indicated loca-
tion. With visible arrow cues, the impact of the overlearned stimulus 
is so strong that an effect occurs exogenously without such an action 
plan. Masked cues, however, presumably only impact the system if it is 
set up accordingly.
To test this assumption, we ran Experiment 2 with an overall cue 
validity of 80%. With this manipulation, the arrow cues were predictive 
regarding the target’s location, and participants most likely formed an 
action plan to use the arrow cues to shift their attention.
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Figure 2.
response times (rts) in experiment 1 (overall cue validity 50%). the dark grey bars represent rts in trials with invalid cues, the light 
grey bars represent rts in trials with valid cues. the bars in the left column depict rts with non-masked cues, and the bars in the right 
column depict rts with masked cues. ** indicates effects with p < .01.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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ExpErImEnt 2
Method
ParticiPants
Twenty students who had not participated in Experiment 1 par-
ticipated  in  individual  sessions  of  approximately  50  min  either  in 
fulfillment of course requirements or in return for payment (6 €). 
Participants were 17 females and three males with an average age of 22 
years. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and were naive with respect to the hypothesis of the experiment. 
aPParatus, stimuli, Procedure, and design
Apparatus,  stimuli,  procedure,  and  design  were  identical  to 
Experiment 1, except for the following changes: The arrow cues had 
a validity of 80%, so that the target appeared in the cued location in 
80% of the trials, and in the other location in 20% of the trials. All 
other combinations of cue (left/right-pointing arrow), presence of a 
mask or a line, target identity (X/O), and target side (left/right) varied 
orthogonally, with the target side corresponding to the arrow in 80% 
of the trials. In total, there were 40 trials, of which 32 were valid and 
eight were invalid trials, in a block, which was run 18 times (720 trials 
altogether). After every 120 trials, participants were allowed a short, 
self-paced break. Participants were informed that the non-masked ar-
row is pointing to 80% correctly to the location where the target letter 
will appear. 
assessment of cue Visibility
Assessment of cue visibility was identical to Experiment 1, except 
for the fact that in Experiment 2, 192 trials with non-masked and 
masked arrow cues were applied as visibility test directly after the main 
experiment. In contrast to the main experiment, the arrow cues were 
no longer predictive to the side where the target letter would appear, 
as otherwise participants would be able to construe from the target’s 
location which arrow was probably shown. Participants were informed 
about this. 
Results
Validity effects
Trials with RTs deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from 
the mean RT of each participant and each condition were excluded 
(2.1 %). Mean RTs for correct responses were submitted to the analy-
sis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  with  the  within-subject  factors  Masking 
(masked and non-masked cue) and Validity (valid and invalid cue). 
The factor Masking was significant, F(1, 19) = 5.1, p < .05, η2 = .21, 
as well as the factor Validity, F(1, 19) = 19.4, p < .001, η2 = .51. The 
interaction  Masking  ×  Validity  was  not  significant,  F(1, 19) = 2.4, 
p = .13. Participants responded faster to non-masked (422 ms) than to 
masked (426 ms) arrow cues. Single comparisons revealed a validity 
effect for non-masked cues, t(19) = 3.9, p < .001, as well as for masked 
cues, t(19) = 3.1, p < .01. Participants responded 12 ms faster to valid 
than to invalid non-masked arrow cues, and 7 ms faster to valid than to 
invalid masked arrow cues (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.
response times (rts) in experiment 2 (overall cue validity 80%). the dark grey bars represent rts in trials with invalid cues, the light 
grey bars represent rts in trials with valid cues. the bars in the left column depict rts with non-masked cues, and the bars in the right 
column depict rts with masked cues. ** indicates effects with p < .01. *** indicates effects with p < .001. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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The overall mean error rate was 7.0%. The same ANOVA of error 
rates revealed no significant effects at all (ps ≥ .64). 
To formally compare the results of both experiments, an additional 
ANOVA with the within-participant factor Validity (valid and invalid) 
and the between-participants factor Experiment (Experiment 1 with 
50 % overall cue validity and Experiment 2 with 80 % overall cue valid-
ity) was conducted for RTs in both experiments for masked arrow cues 
only. The factor Validity was significant, F(1, 38) = 5.3, p < .05, as well 
as the interaction Validity × Experiment, F(1, 38) = 4.8, p < .05. This 
interaction reflects that the validity of the arrow cue influenced RTs in 
Experiment 2, while no such effect was present in Experiment 1.
cue Visibility
Cue visibility was analyzed as in Experiment 1. Participants’ dis-
crimination performance for the non-masked cues was d’ = 3.45, with 
a mean hit rate of 91.7 % and a mean false alarm rate of 8.8 %, and 
deviated from zero, t(19) = 11.53, p < .001. Participants’ discrimination 
performance for the masked cues was d’ = 0.69, with a mean hit rate of 
73.5 % and a mean false alarm rate of 51.3 %, and deviated from zero, 
t(19) = 3.18, p < .01. These data again show a response bias to indicate 
a right-pointing cue in trials with masked cues, as this response was 
given in 62.4% of the trials. Again, as in Experiment 1, the d’ values for 
non-masked and masked arrow cues differed significantly from each 
other, t(38) = 7.44, p < .001. Comparing the results for the visibility of 
the cues between Experiments 1 and 2, neither the d’ values for non-
masked cues, t(38) = -0.41, p = .68, nor for masked cues, t(38) = -0.181, 
p = .86, differed significantly.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, participants responded faster after valid than after 
invalid arrow cues. In contrast to Experiment 1, this validity effect was 
present not only for visible, but also for masked arrow cues, and indi-
cates that shifts of attention were triggered both by visible and masked 
cues. The critical difference to Experiment 1 was that overall cue va-
lidity was raised from 50% to 80%. With cues that are predictive of 
the target’s location above chance level, participants are likely to form 
intentions to use the cues, as this would benefit their performance. This 
intention seems to be crucial for masked cues to have an effect on at-
tention.
When  comparing  the  validity  effects  of  Experiments  1  and  2, 
it seems surprising that the validity effect with visible cues did not 
increase in Experiment 2, but was virtually the same as in Experi-
ment 1. One might expect a larger validity effect with the additional in-
centive to use the cues provided by their increased validity. One reason 
why this was not the case might be the relatively short cue-target SOA 
(stimulus onset asynchrony) used in the experiments at hand (200 ms). 
We conjecture that endogenously driven shifts of attention emerged 
too slowly to be observable in the RT data. So on the one hand, the 
intention to use the cues enabled masked cues to automatically trigger 
shifts of attention that occurred rapidly and thus were observable in 
a validity effect. On the other hand, possible endogenously initiated 
shifts of attention that are due to this intention emerged too late after 
cue onset so that they could not effectively influence RTs and thus did 
not add to the size of the validity effect. As our experiments only had 
one fixed SOA, this hypothesis is of course speculative and would need 
to be corroborated (or dismissed) by similar experiments that imple-
ment different and especially longer SOAs.
GEnEral dIscussIon
We conducted two experiments to investigate the effect of visible and 
masked arrow cues on attention. We were able to replicate findings that 
visible, centrally presented arrows trigger automatic shifts of attention 
(Friesen et al., 2004; Gibson & Bryant, 2005; Hommel et al., 2001; Pratt 
et al., 2010; Tipples, 2002). Most importantly, masked arrow cues also 
triggered shifts of attention, yet only when overall cue validity was 80%, 
whereas masked cues remained ineffective when overall cue validity 
was 50%. Thus, our results showed that with masked arrows, the effect 
of centrally presented arrows is not purely stimulus driven, but modu-
lated by the partcipants’ current intentions and top-down settings. 
In recent studies, arrow cues, among other stimuli, like eye gaze 
cues (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 
1999), have been found to have automatic effects on attention when 
presented centrally as spatial cues. Usually, centrally presented spatial 
cues only affect attention if the observer intends to shift attention 
according to the cue. We conjecture that the observer endogenously 
controls these shifts of attention, and they are only initiated if cue 
validity is above chance level so that the cues benefit performance. 
Arrow cues, however, seem to have a more automatic effect on atten-
tion. Presumably due to their overlearned spatial meaning, attention 
is automatically oriented towards the indicated location by arrows, 
regardless of cue validity. 
Such automatic capture of attention can otherwise be observed with 
exogenous cues that appear directly at target location. Exogenous cues 
even have the power to orient attention towards them when they are 
presented subliminally, which underlines the automatic nature of the 
effect (Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Ivanoff 
& Klein, 2003; Lambert et al., 1999; McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse et 
al., 2007). It was also found, however, that this exogenous attentional 
capture is not a solely stimulus-driven effect, but is contingent on the 
cues matching the participant’s top-down settings. The first aim of our 
experiments was therefore to test if masked arrow cues affect attention. 
Our second aim was to investigate whether possible effects of masked 
arrow cues on attention are purely stimulus-driven or depend on top-
down settings.
In  both  experiments,  participants  had  to  respond  to  a  laterally 
presented target by pressing one of two response keys. In each trial, 
an arrow cue appeared in the center of the screen. In half of the trials, 
however, the arrow was metacontrast-masked by a following stimulus. 
In Experiment 1, the arrows had an overall validity of 50% and there-
fore were not predictive of the target’s location. With visible arrows, we 
found a validity effect. Participants responded faster when the arrow 
pointed to the location of the target than when the target appeared on 
the other side. This reflects shifts of attention to the indicated location AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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and thereby facilitated processing when the target actually appeared 
there, but hindered processing when attention had to be reoriented 
first when the target appeared on the other side. This result replicated 
earlier works on the effect of spatial symbols like arrows on the orient-
ing of attention (Hommel et al., 2001; Pratt et al., 2010; Tipples, 2002).
 When the arrow was masked, however, RTs were not influenced by 
the validity of the arrow, and thus attention was not shifted according 
to the arrow’s direction. This result is in line with studies that observed 
that masked exogenous cues have to fit to the top-down settings, that 
is, the cues’ features have to fit to the current intentions and action 
plans to be able to capture attention (Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; 
Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009; 
Ansorge & Neumann, 2005). For example, when participants in a study 
by Ansorge and Neumann (2005) had to respond to red stimuli, ex-
ogenous cues that were black did not draw attention while exogenous 
cues that were red did. 
Alternatively, it is possible that participants tried to actively ignore 
the cues because the participants knew the cues had no actual value 
in helping to locate the target. Maybe participants were successfully 
ignoring masked arrows. Non-masked arrows, however, still impacted 
on attention and thus it seems they could not be ignored successfully. 
This again would parallel the effects of exogenous peripheral cues that 
also capture attention if participants were instructed to ignore the cues 
(Jonides, 1981).
To investigate whether top-down settings are crucial for the effects 
of masked arrow cues on attention, in Experiment 2 overall cue validity 
was raised to 80% to encourage participants to use the arrow cues, and 
to form fitting intentions and top-down settings. With visible arrow 
cues, we again found a validity effect that reflected shifts of attention 
to the location indicated by the cue. Importantly, a validity effect was 
also present with masked arrow cues. Thus, in contrast to Experi-
ment 1, attention was oriented according to the masked arrows.
As the visibility tests of both experiments did not result in different 
measures of sensitivity between experiments (with d’ values of 0.64 and 
0.69), this result cannot be attributed to differences in the visibility of 
the masked cues, but is due to the manipulation of cue validity and the 
corresponding top-down settings. In Experiment 1, participants had 
no incentive and, thus, most likely no intention to orient their attention 
according to the arrows (or possibly even tried to actively ignore the 
cues). Clearly visible arrows still had an impact on attention because 
of  their  overlearned  spatial  meaning,  but  when  participants  were 
presumably not aware of the arrow, the missing top-down settings to 
orient attention accordingly when an arrow is perceived was crucial 
and prevented the masked cues from having an effect. In Experiment 2, 
the incentive and the intention to use the cues was provided by the high 
cue validity. This top-down control setting enabled the masked arrows 
to impact on attention. 
Remarkably, previous research that investigated whether sublimi-
nally presented central arrow stimuli impact on behavior, that is, motor 
responses, also comes to the conclusion that top-down settings are cru-
cial for masked arrows to exert an effect (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Klapp, 2009; Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken 
& Eimer, 2004; Schlaghecken, Klapp, & Maylor, 2009). This assump-
tion  is  also  in  line  with  many  studies  on  masked  priming  effects 
indicating that subliminally presented stimuli generally impacted on 
behavior only if the prime fits the current top-down setting/current 
intentions (e.g., Ansorge, 2006; Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; 
Kiesel, 2009; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & 
Hoffmann, 2006; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003, 2005; Martens & 
Kiefer, 2009; Pohl, Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2010). Taken together, 
these results show that the effects of masked stimuli both on behavior 
and on attention are based on strikingly similar preconditions. Further 
research might investigate if these similarities are due to the often-
times proposed close link between attention and the motor system 
(e.g., Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987), or if there is a basic 
mechanism of unconscious processing that also applies to the priming 
of other processes besides motor or attentional processes. 
To conclude, we assume that the underlying mechanisms of how 
masked arrows induce spatial shifts of attention are comparable to the 
mechanisms of how masked exogenous cues trigger shifts of attention. 
Both have effects on attention that seem automatic in nature. These 
effects, however, are not purely stimulus-driven, but depend on current 
top-down settings.
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